First-Mover Advantage Beyond Markets: Evidence from the Tribal Gaming Industry. (Solo Authored) Job Market Paper
Abstract: Regulation is often co-produced through iterative interaction between policymakers and firms. In nascent industries, early participants in regulatory formation may shape rules that persist for decades. I examine whether such firms—termed policy leaders—secure durable competitive advantages beyond traditional market first-mover effects. Studying the emergence of the U.S. Tribal gaming industry following the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988, I find that Tribes that initiated early negotiations with state governments operate significantly larger casinos decades later, even after accounting for early market entry and pre-existing competitive conditions. Markets containing policy leaders are also more concentrated, suggesting persistent shifts in competitive structure.
Pulling Apart or Pulling Together: Product Positioning, Firm-Level Action, and Industry Self-Regulation. (With Dennis Yao and Young Hou)
Abstract: This paper develops a theoretical model of industry self-regulation to examine the strategic trade-offs between unilateral and collective action under regulatory threat. In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, firms may voluntarily adopt higher standards to gain differentiation or build compliance capabilities before potential government intervention. While regulatory threat can incentivize early unilateral adoption by creating insurance-like benefits, such actions generate asymmetries that undermine subsequent industry-wide self-regulation. Even absent free-riding, differentiation and capability advantages increase rivals’ incentives to defect from collective agreements. The model highlights a central tension: privately optimal repositioning may reduce the feasibility of coordinated self-regulation in emerging industries.
Inducing Self-Regulation with Asymmetric Firms. (With Dennis Yao and Young Hou)
Abstract: We examine the tension between individual firm incentives and industry-level benefits in the context of voluntary industry self-regulation. Because self-regulation responds to the threat of regulation, and the threat of regulation is impacted by both lobbying and self-regulatory actions, self-regulation and lobbying should be considered in concert rather than in isolation. We explore these interactions using a two-firm game-theoretic model that involves a lobbying stage in which the overall regulatory threat is influenced followed by a market stage in which self-regulation may be implemented. Among other results, we show that lobbying too aggressively against regulation may undermine the prospects for industry self-regulation, and that obtaining self-regulation may require firms to lobby in favor of limited regulation.
Who Buys the Free Press? Business Reporting following Private Equity Newspaper Acquisitions. (with Jackson Anderson) Data Collection
Initial Summary: News media is widely regarded as an essential pillar of democracy. In a business context, the media often serves as a watchdog against misconduct and as a forum for stakeholder engagement. However, media companies are also businesses and are subject to economic pressures that may distort their role as a strictly informational institution. We examine the effects of economic incentives on business reporting by exploiting a strong shock to newspapers’ financial incentives: acquisition by private equity (PE). Specifically, we study how PE ownership affects the media’s ability to scrutinize corporate misconduct and provide a platform for stakeholder and policy discourse.
Leveraging staggered PE acquisitions of U.S. newspapers between 2000 and 2024, we employ a difference-in-differences design to estimate how heightened sensitivity to financial incentives shapes newspaper coverage and downstream outcomes. We anticipate that PE ownership will increase the sensitivity of news coverage to advertiser spending, reduce scrutiny of portfolio company misconduct, and strategically amplify coverage aligned with owners’ lobbying interests. At the community level, we expect these coverage shifts to manifest in increased corporate misconduct violations and altered voting patterns on PE-relevant policy issues.
Why Is the Business Case for Social Compliance in Global Value Chains Unpersuasive? Rethinking Costs, Prices and Profits. (With Laura Babbitt and Drusilla Brown)
International Labour Review, 160 (4), 2021
Abstract: Stakeholders in global value chains (GVCs) commonly argue that factory managers will choose humane working conditions if they can be persuaded that social compliance improves firm performance. Yet, despite evidence that humane conditions increase productivity, product quality and on-time delivery, inhumane conditions in GVCs persist. Evidence from a sample of factories in the Better Work programme in Indonesia, Jordan and Viet Nam indicates that achieving social compliance may be costly, offsetting productivity benefits. A positive impact on profits depends on international buyer sourcing practices, including higher output prices. The COVID-19 pandemic has confirmed the key role played by buyers in determining working conditions.
Do Financial Literacy Training and Clarifying Pay Calculations Reduce Abuse at Work? (With Negin Toosi, Elyse Voegeli, Laura Babbitt, and Drusilla Brown)
Journal of Social Issues, 76 (3), 2020
Abstract: Understanding the link between effort and pay is important for workers. Yet, in many parts of the world, women lack critical financial literacy skills and have employers who do not clearly communicate compensation schemes. Using randomized controlled trials, we first examined the effects of a training program to improve financial literacy among female workers in apparel factories in India and Bangladesh (baseline N = 1,085). Training increased workers’ financial planning through the use of a budget and utilization of banking systems, both of which contributed to increased savings. We next examined the effects of a management intervention in factories in Myanmar (baseline N = 429) and found improvements among the predominantly female workers in perceived pay clarity. Pay clarity, in turn, was associated with lower verbal abuse in study factories. Results indicate that both financial literacy and pay clarity are important in shaping female workers’ experiences and vulnerability to financial exploitation.
Human Resource Management and Abuse in Global Supply Chains (With Laura Babbitt, Drusilla Brown, and Elyse Voegeli)
Book Chapter in Handbook on Globalisation and Labour Standards, edited by Kimberly Ann Elliott, Edward Elgar Press, 2022
Abstract: There is a longstanding debate as to whether humane working conditions improve firm performance. A survey of factory managers indicates that managers believe that humane conditions increase productivity but may not increase profits. These beliefs are supported by existing empirical evidence. Humane conditions of work increase productivity but also increase unit labor costs, leaving an indeterminate effect on profits. The business case for humane labor management, then, has a limited role in promoting social compliance. Rather, social compliance is driven by social factors and managerial capital. Managers of compliant firms believe that they are adhering to an industry social norm. In contrast, managers in noncompliant firms see workers in dehumanized terms. Dehumanization adversely affects the processing of information on conditions of work and the relationship between working conditions and firm performance. Managerial errors, particularly in the design of incentive systems that leave factory, supervisor and worker interests misaligned, contribute to abuse at work such as verbal abuse and sexual harassment.